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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide for the exclusion of 
otherwise relevant evidence on public policy grounds. Rule 407 is one 
example. In its current form as amended in 1997, the rule provides: 
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, 
measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made 
the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent 
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable 
conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a 
need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not require the 
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for 
another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or 
feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or 
impeachment.1 
Rule 407 prevents plaintiffs from introducing evidence of remedial 
measures taken by the defendant after an event that caused an injury or 
harm in order to prove negligence, culpable conduct, or strict product 
liability. The primary rationale for such exclusion is that individuals, 
corporations, or municipalities should not be discouraged from taking 
remedial measures that may prevent future injury or harm to individuals. 
While Rule 407 provides for broad exclusion, its current language is 
limited to remedial measures which are taken after an event that may 
have caused the injury or harm. We suggest that the language of Rule 
407 be amended to preclude the admissibility of remedial measures 
which are taken both before and after an injury. This change will 
implement the relevancy rationale for the rule. 
II. PURPOSE OF 1997 AMENDMENT 
The original language of the 1975 version of Rule 407 barred the 
admissibility of remedial measures taken “after an event”2 as an 
admission of negligence or culpable conduct. However, this language 
                                                                                                             
 1 FED. R. EVID. 407. 
 2 See Chase v. Gen. Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 21 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing the 
preamble to the 1975 version of Rule 407 that excluded evidence “[w]hen, after an event, 
measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to 
occur, evidence of subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable 
conduct in connection with the event”). 
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was ambiguous as to what constituted the critical “event”3 that would 
trigger exclusion.4 The 1997 amendment was intended to clarify this 
ambiguity by rephrasing the rule to only bar remedial measures taken 
“after an injury or harm, allegedly caused by an event.”5 Additionally, 
the 1997 amendment adopted the predominant judicial view that Rule 
407 also applies to exclude subsequent remedial measures in strict 
product liability cases.6 
The Advisory Committee explained that this change in the language 
was necessary “to clarify that the rule applies only to changes made after 
the occurrence that produced the damages giving rise to the action.”7 The 
rule “does not apply to bar evidence of preventive measures taken before 
an accident.”8 The amendment was intended to supersede the “minority 
view that applied Rule 407 to exclude . . . evidence of pre-accident 
conduct.”9 The justification was that such evidence need not be excluded 
under Rule 407 because it could be excluded under Rule 401 and Rule 
403 relevancy principles. 
III. HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND DEFINITIONS 
A. Codification of Common Law 
Formalization of the exclusion of subsequent remedial measures as 
an admission of negligence or culpability was developed by the courts in 
England and the United States as a common law rule of evidence.10 It 
                                                                                                             
 3 See DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 2.6.4, at 
2:62-1 (Aspen Law & Bus. Supp., 2001) [hereinafter NEW WIGMORE] (explaining that 
under the original, pre-1997 version of the Rule, “‘event’ might have included . . . the 
manufacture of a product in question”). 
 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
407.05[1], at 407-23 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2005) 
[hereinafter WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE]; see also Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor, 988 
F.2d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that the critical “event” was the sale of the 
allegedly defective product rather than the accident). 
 5 FED. R. EVID. 407; see also Roberts v. Harnischfeger Corp., 901 F.2d 42, 44 n.1 
(5th Cir. 1989) (stating that the term “event” refers to the accident that precipitated the 
suit); accord Chase, 856 F.2d at 21. 
 6 FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note. 
 7 Id. 
 8 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 4. 
 9 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 407.05[1], at 407-24. 
 10 See Columbia & P. S. R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 208 (1892) (citing 
Baron Bramwell in Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 Law Times N.S. 261, 263 
(1869) for the proposition that “[p]eople do not furnish evidence against themselves 
simply by adopting a new plan in order to prevent the recurrence of an accident. I think 
that a proposition to the contrary would be barbarous. It would be, as I have often had 
occasion to tell juries, to hold that, because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore 
it was foolish before.”) (emphasis added)); see also Marcie J. Freeman, Spanning The 
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precluded the introduction and circumstantial use of evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures to show negligence or culpability.11 As 
early as 1892, the United States Supreme Court recognized that such 
evidence is “incompetent”12 and noted that the only two states that 
allowed the use of “subsequent changes [as] evidence of prior 
negligence”–Pennsylvania and Kansas–did not justify their position by 
“satisfactory reasons.”13 In 1942, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) 
published the Model Code which became the first official collection of 
common law rules of evidence, including “one of the first, and simplest, 
promulgations of the remedial measures rule.”14 
Almost immediately after its release, the Model Code met strong 
opposition from within the ALI itself. The dissenting view – that the 
Model Code granted excessive discretion to the trial judge15 – was the 
major point of contention and is seen as the most “common explanation” 
for the failure of the Model Code.16 Noting the rejection of the Model 
                                                                                                             
Spectrum: Proposed Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 407, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
1175, 1179 n.23 (1997) (explaining that the Official Comment following the Uniform 
Rule 51 was a single sentence that “[t]his states the well settled common law rule”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 11 RICHARD O. LEMPERT, SAMUEL R. GROSS & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, A MODERN 
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 277 (American Casebook Series 3d ed. 2000) (1977) 
[hereinafter LEMPERT]. 
 12 Columbia, 144 U.S. at 207. There, a worker was seriously injured in the course of 
his employment, when a pulley assembly collapsed. The Court held that the trial court 
improperly admitted evidence of safety modification that took place after the accident as 
an admission of previous neglect. Id. at 208. The Court recognized that: 
The evidence is incompetent because the taking of such precautions against 
the future is not to be construed as an admission of responsibility for the 
past, has no legitimate tendency to prove that the defendant had been 
negligent before the accident happened, and is calculated to distract the 
minds of the jury from the real issue, and to create a prejudice against the 
defendant. 
Id. at 207. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See Freeman, supra note 10, at 1179 n.29 (reciting Model Code Rule 308: 
“Evidence of the taking of a precaution by a person to prevent the repetition of a previous 
harm or the occurrence of a similar harm or evidence of the adoption of a plan requiring 
that such precaution be taken is inadmissible as tending to prove that his failure to take 
such a precaution to prevent the previous harm was negligent.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
 15 See Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking”, 53 
HASTINGS L.J. 843, 849 (2002) (explaining that Dean Wigmore, Chief Consultant to the 
ALI on its Model Code of Evidence, led the opposition by arguing that the Model Code 
granted excessive discretion to trial judges and complained that the Model Code did not 
address all the areas of evidence law, “raising the problem of whether the common law 
aspects of evidence law that were not included would still exist or had been repealed by 
implication”). 
 16 Id. 
2007] A Proposal to Amend Rule 407 439 
Code by the states, the American Bar Association (ABA) collaborated 
with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(“NCCUSL”) to create the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence, which 
offered another version of the rule against the admissibility of remedial 
measures.17 However, this proposed reform was met with the same 
disinterest as the Model Code. In fact, only three states initially adopted 
the Uniform Rules.18 It was not until January 3, 1975 that President Ford 
signed the new Federal Rules of Evidence into law, thus establishing, at 
least in the federal courts, an exclusionary rule for subsequent remedial 
measures.19 
B. Purpose of the Rule 
Exclusion of evidence under Rule 407 is based on public policy 
considerations and evidentiary rationale.20 Simply stated, the public 
policy purpose of Rule 407 is to “encourag[e] people to take, or at least 
not discourag[e] them from taking, steps in furtherance of added 
safety”21 and that such remedial measures are “not an admission”22 of 
                                                                                                             
 17 See Freeman, supra note 10, at 1179 n.31 (citing Uniform Rule 51: “Subsequent 
Remedial Conduct. When, after the occurrence of an event remedial or precautionary 
measures are taken, which, if taken previously would have tended to make the event less 
likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is not admissible to prove 
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event”) (internal citation omitted) 
 18 See Scallen, supra note 15, at 851 (stating that only Kansas, New Jersey and Utah 
adopted the original 1953 Uniform Rules). 
 19 Id. at 854. 
 20 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 7.04[1] (Matthew Bender 
& Company, Inc., rev. vol. 2006) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL]. 
 21 FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note. 
 22 See 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 407:1, at 961-62 
(Thomson West Publishing 6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter GRAHAM’S HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE] (explaining that “remedial measures may be motivated by a desire to 
exercise the highest care and thus in fact not be an admission of negligence or culpable 
conduct”). Graham cites Professor Wigmore to explain that: 
if machines, bridges, sidewalks, and other objects, never caused corporal 
injury except through the negligence of their owner, then his act of 
improving their condition, after the happening of an injury thereat, would 
indicate a belief on his part that the injury was caused by his negligence. But 
the assumption is plainly false; injuries may be and are constantly caused by 
reason of the inevitable accident, and also by reason of contributory 
negligence of the injured person. To improve the condition of the injury-
causing object is therefore to indicate a belief merely that it has been 
capable of causing such an injury, but indicates nothing more, and is 
equally consistent with a belief in injury by mere accident, or in 
contributory negligence, as well as by the owner’s negligence. Mere 
capacity of a place or thing to cause an injury is not the fact that constitutes 
liability for an owner; it must be a capacity which could have been known to 
an owner using reasonable diligence and foresight, and a capacity to injure 
persons taking reasonable care in its use. 
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negligence, culpable conduct, or strict liability in product design, 
manufacture, or a need for a warning or instruction. The evidentiary 
rationale is that such evidence is unfairly prejudicial with little probative 
value because it has the potential to excite the sympathies of the jury and 
to lead it to find liability from remedial actions rather than from more 
relevant and probative evidence.23 
i. Public Policy Basis 
Exclusion is founded on public policy considerations that without 
the protection afforded by Rule 407, individuals, corporations, and 
municipalities would not take corrective steps after an injury or harm to 
prevent similar future injury or harm for fear that evidence of the 
remedial measures would be used against them in future litigation24 to 
circumstantially show negligence, culpability, or strict product liability.25 
Professor Saltzburg has suggested that this policy justification for 
exclusion under Rule 407 is flawed because it is probable that a 
reasonable would-be defendant, even without the protection of Rule 407, 
“would be very likely to take corrective measures in order to avoid more 
serious liability for future accidents.”26 Professor Rice has also suggested 
that the presumption that people may be dissuaded from taking remedial 
measures, if such evidence could be used as an admission of fault, may 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
 23 WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 20, § 7.04[1]. 
 24 See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984) (opining that 
if evidence of subsequent remedial measures was “admissible to prove liability, the 
incentive to take such measures will be reduced”). The court explained that the “major 
purpose of Rule 407 is to promote safety by removing the disincentive to make repairs 
(or take other safety measures) after an accident that would exist if the accident victim 
could use those measures as evidence of the defendant’s liability.” Id. Judge Posner 
further reasoned: 
One might think it not only immoral but reckless for an injurer, having been 
alerted by the accident to the existence of danger, not to take steps to correct 
the danger. But accidents are low-probability events. The probability of 
another accident may be much smaller than the probability that the victim of 
the accident that has already occurred will sue the injurer and, if permitted, 
will make devastating use at trial of any measures that the injurer may have 
taken since the accident to reduce the danger. 
Id. 
 25 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL 
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 407.02[2], at 407-4 (Matthew Bender 8th ed. 2002) 
(1975) [hereinafter SALTZBURG MANUAL]. 
 26 See id. at 407-5 (opining that “most defendants would correct a dangerous 
condition after an accident even if Rule 407 did not exist”). Saltzburg explains that the 
policy consideration underlying exclusion under the rule comes with an implicit 
exception that subsequent remedial measures may be admissible when such admissibility 
would not create a “disincentive to repair.”  Id. § 407.02[2], at 407-6. 
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be defective because such a conclusion requires an acceptance that 1) the 
“existence of the privilege against the introduction of such evidence is 
generally known,” which is highly unlikely; and 2) that “people risk 
future liability through potential injuries to others as a result of the 
continued existence of the condition, rather than risk the increased 
possibility of being found liable for the injury that has already occurred 
by changing that condition.”27 Nonetheless, in spite of serious logical 
flaws, this policy rationale remains a credible justification for the rule. 
ii. Relevancy Basis 
The evidentiary basis for the exclusion of evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures as an admission of negligence, culpability, or material 
issues in product liability cases is a common sense conclusion that 
evidence of remedial measures is of “marginal relevance” and almost 
always substantially more prejudicial than probative.28 Another view 
suggests that such evidence “tends to be more persuasive than is 
logically justified.”29 The concern is that a jury may give excessive 
weight and consideration to evidence of subsequent remedial measures 
instead of focusing its attention to other more probative evidence on the 
material facts in dispute. In fact, subsequent remedial measures are 
usually not determinative on the finding that the defendant had breached 
an established duty of care, “because he might have made the repairs to 
correct conditions that either did not exist or were not apparent until after 
the accident.”30 
iii. Application in Negligence Cases 
Cases arising out of negligence require the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant had a “duty not to expose the plaintiff to a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of injury, that the defendant breached that duty as 
defined by the applicable standard of care, that the breach [proximately] 
caused the damage, and that there was actual damage.”31 All four 
                                                                                                             
 27 PAUL R. RICE & ROY A. KATRIEL, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES 
OF EVIDENCE 241 (Matthew Bender 5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter RICE EVIDENCE]. 
 28 See SALTZBURG MANUAL, supra note 25, § 407.02[3], at 407-6 (explaining that, by 
its nature, marginally relevant evidence is “almost always substantially outweighed by 
the risk of jury confusion created by the introduction of a subsequent remedial measure”); 
see also GRAHAM’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 22. 
 29 RICE EVIDENCE, supra note 27, at 240. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Eleanor D. Kinney & William M. Sage, Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims in 
the Medicare Program: Can It Be Done?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 77, 115 (2006). 
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elements must be proved in order to establish a prima facia case for 
negligence.32 
The policy consideration for applying Rule 407 to negligence cases 
is that the reasonable person of ordinary prudence, who becomes aware 
of a dangerous or a potentially injury-causing condition, “may be 
expected to do everything feasible to remedy that condition regardless of 
the reasonableness of [his] earlier care.”33 The relevancy basis for 
exclusion under Rule 407 is the idea that there is no presumptive 
connection between an injury and breach of an established duty of care.34 
This makes evidence of subsequent remedial measures unfairly 
prejudicial because the jury may become confused and find liability 
based on the improper inference that post-injury corrective steps 
necessarily imply a breach of an established duty of care. 
Rule 407 retains the four-part structure of the tort of negligence. It 
allows would-be defendants an opportunity to “do as they please until 
they become aware that their actions harm others, at which point they 
acquire a duty to avoid harms that cost the victim more than they profit 
the actor.”35 In effect, the rule prevents courts from punishing potential 
defendants for taking remedial measures that “the law and good 
citizenship require.”36 It avoids imposing liability on a defendant who did 
not have a duty of care, established or implied, but who nonetheless 
made an effort to ensure that similar injury or harm does not take place 
again, while retaining liability where there has been a clear showing of a 
breach of a duty of care.37 
iv. Application in Strict Product Liability Cases 
Strict liability cases require the plaintiff to show that the defendant 
manufactured, sold, or distributed a product that is defective in design or 
                                                                                                             
 32 See Hall v. Arthur, 141 F.3d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[t]he basic 
elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages”). 
 33 LEMPERT, supra note 11, at 278. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See id. at 279-80 (demonstrating that this construction does not require a dog 
owner to “muzzle the beast until it reveals its proclivity to bite”). Professors Lempert, 
Gross, and Liebman explain that Rule 407 retained “this ‘one bite for free’ conception of 
negligence.”  Id. at 280. 
 36 See id. (discussing that duty is established when people knew or should have 
known about certain hazards). The rule was intended to “afford some protection” to those 
people who fail to take anticipatory measures (most preferred by tort law), as long as they 
took subsequent remedial measures (less favored by the tort law because the harm 
already took place), and not act at all (least preferred by the tort law). Id. 
 37 See generally id. 
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manufacture, or provides an insufficient warning.38 Prior to 1997, there 
was substantial disagreement among the federal circuits as to whether 
Rule 407 applies to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures in 
strict liability cases.39 However, the 1997 amendment expressly adopted 
the majority view,40 precluding the use of such evidence to show “a 
defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design or a need for a warning 
or instruction.”41 
Prior to the amendment, the most common and compelling rationale 
for applying the exclusionary rule to product liability actions was 
grounded on the social policy “desire” not to deter remedial measures by 
manufacturers.42 It has been suggested by Professor Lampert that this 
justification is not always accurate43 because corporations are under a 
common statutory duty to make repairs and may be liable for punitive 
damages if they “ignore known dangers.”44 In his opinion, this duty and 
potential statutory liability likely overshadow “any incentive the rules of 
evidence may give them to forgo making repairs.”45 However, as the 
Ninth Circuit explained that, practically speaking, there is no “difference 
between strict liability and negligence in defective design cases,” and as 
such, the “rationale to encourage remedial measures remains the same.”46 
                                                                                                             
 38 See Charles E. Cantu, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability for Ultra-
Hazardous Activities from Strict Products Liability Under Section 402a of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts: Two Parallel Lines of Reasoning that Should Never Meet, 
35 AKRON L. REV. 31, 40 (2001) (exploring the history of the strict liability tort concept). 
The author explains that the concept of strict liability began as an English judicial 
construct in Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), and has been accepted by 
American jurisdictions. Id. at 34-35. The author continues to discuss Sections 520 and 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See generally id.; Carlin v. Superior Court, 
920 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Cal. 1996). 
 39 See SALTZBURG MANUAL, supra note 25, § 407.02[6], at 407-8 (explaining that the 
pre-1997 version of the rule prohibited evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken 
after an event “only if offered to prove ‘negligence or culpable conduct’”). 
 40 See id. (expressing the view that “[d]espite the language of the Rule . . . most 
Courts had held that Rule 407 excluded subsequent remedial measures” in product 
liability actions); see also Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1276 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(opining that Rule 407 applies to “products liability actions generally regardless of the 
specific theory advanced.”); LEMPERT, supra note 11, at 281 (expressing the view that the 
“dominant (though not uniform) view in the federal courts was that FRE 407 applied in 
strict liability as well as in negligence actions”). 
 41 FED. R. EVID. 407. 
 42 LEMPERT, supra note 11, at 281. 
 43 See id. (noting that this reasoning may not always be convincing because most 
strict liability defendants are large corporations “to which the rationale of promoting 
repairs has little force”). 
 44 Id. at 282. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637, amended by 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 
1986) (adopting the position that Rule 407 applies to strict liability cases). 
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From an evidentiary standpoint, the focus of a judicial inquiry in 
strict liability cases centers on the “condition of the product ‘at the time 
it leaves the seller’s hands’” and not its condition at the time of injury.47 
To admit evidence of remedial measures taken after the event that caused 
the injury or harm would introduce facts that are outside the scope of the 
jury’s consideration. Consequently, such evidence becomes unfairly 
prejudicial because it may lead the jury to find liability by considering 
the condition of the product after remedial measures, rather than focusing 
on the condition of the product at the time that it was released into the 
stream of commerce.48 
C. Remedial Measures 
The remedial measures contemplated by Rule 407 are “any kind of 
change, repair, or precaution.”49 While this definition is broad, “acts that 
do nothing to make the harm less likely to occur should not be excluded 
under Rule 407.”50 This means that remedial measures must actually, or 
be reasonably calculated to, prevent future harm.51 Otherwise, if the 
conduct does nothing to reduce the potential of future injury or harm, it 
cannot implicate the social policy underlying the rule of encouraging 
injury-reducing repairs.52 This policy would also not be implicated by 
acts that were not done voluntarily because use of such remedial actions 
at trial would not deter other potential defendants from taking remedial 
measures that may save them from later litigation.53 
                                                                                                             
 47 Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 104 F.3d 472, 481 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 48 See generally id. 
 49 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 4, at § 407.02[3]; see also LEMPERT, 
supra note 11, at 277 (providing examples of remedial measures such as lowered speed 
limits, new chemical formulas, and revised rules and practices); RICE EVIDENCE, supra 
note 27, at 239 (explaining that “changes in a product’s design, warnings to consumers on 
particular dangers in using a product, the imposition of safety procedures, changes in 
methods of operation, the discontinuation of certain practices, the installation of new or 
different equipment, the discharge of an old employee or retention of a new one, as well 
as the repair of a defective condition” constitute remedial measures within the language 
of the rule and its judicial application). 
 50 GRAHAM’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 22, § 407:1, at 960. 
 51 See generally id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 888 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(explaining that the policy of not discouraging would-be defendants from taking remedial 
actions would not be implicated when such measures are compelled by governmental 
mandate). 
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i. Measures Taken by Third Party 
It is recognized that remedial measures taken by a nonparty to the 
litigation are outside the scope of exclusion under Rule 407.54 For 
example, in Dixon v. International Harvester Co.,55 the plaintiff 
employee sued the defendant tractor manufacturer for personal injuries 
that allegedly resulted from a defective cab design.56 The Fifth Circuit 
allowed evidence that after the plaintiff’s injury, his employer, who was 
not a party to the litigation, took protective steps to prevent future similar 
injuries by modifying the tractor cab design.57 The court held that 
evidence of remedial steps taken by a nonparty were outside the scope of 
Rule 407 and were circumstantially admissible to show that the tractor 
was improperly designed.58 The court reasoned that the policy of not 
“discouraging defendants from making necessary repairs or changes to 
products or dangerous conditions” was not applicable where the remedial 
measures were taken by a nonparty to the litigation.59 
Similarly in TLT-Babcock v. Emerson Electric Co.,60 the Fourth 
Circuit held that evidence of remedial modifications to the design of a 
ventilation system was properly admitted because it was made by the 
city, a nonparty to the litigation, and not by the defendant who originally 
designed the system.61 The court reasoned that circumstantial use of such 
evidence was proper because a nonparty “will not be inhibited from 
taking remedial measures if such actions are allowed into evidence 
against the defendant.”62 
In Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Williams,63 the court 
distinguished the exclusion of subsequent remedial measures taken by a 
defendant from a nonparty. The Fifth Circuit opined that the 
admissibility of preventive remedial measures by a defendant should not 
be used against that defendant at trial as an implied admission of 
liability.64 However, remedial measures taken by a nonparty can be 
admitted against a defendant because the nonparty will not be dissuaded 
from taking future remedial measures since the evidence in question is 
                                                                                                             
 54 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 
449 (The Nat’l Inst. for Trial Advocacy 1983) [hereinafter GRAHAM TEXT, RULES, 
ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS]. 
 55 754 F.2d 573, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 583. 
 60 33 F.3d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 370 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 64 Id. 
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not being offered against it.65 The court reasoned that evidence of repairs 
made by the State Highway Department, which was not a party to the 
suit, was properly admitted as circumstantial proof that a railroad 
crossing was hazardous before and after the injury and prior to the 
repair.66 
Professor Saltzburg has suggested that since the express language 
of the rule does nothing to distinguish “between measures taken by 
defendants and nondefendants” it should be used to exclude “any 
measure which, if taken, would have made the event less likely to 
occur,” regardless of who takes such measures.67 Our proposal does not 
incorporate this view because as Saltzburg himself notes, courts usually 
hold that Rule 407 is inapplicable to exclude remedial measures taken by 
“parties who are not responsible for the injury or harm”68 since a 
nonparty to the litigation “will not be inhibited from taking remedial 
measures if [those] measures are used against a defendant.”69 
In line with Saltzburg’s observation, the Third Circuit in Diehl v. 
Blaw-Knox70 opined that “admission of remedial measures by a non-
party necessarily will not expose that non-party to liability, and therefore, 
will not discourage the non-party from taking the remedial measures in 
the first place.”71 Citing a myriad of cases, the court noted that each of 
the circuits to address the issue has concluded that “Rule 407 does not 
apply to subsequent remedial measures taken by a nonparty.”72 Courts 
can still exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken by 
nonparties under Rule 403 as being unfairly prejudicial, or under Rule 
401 and Rule 402 as not relevant.73 
                                                                                                             
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 SALTZBURG MANUAL, supra note 25, § 407.02[9], at 407-13. 
 68 Id. (internal citation excluded). 
 69 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 407.05[2], at 407-26; see also 
GRAHAM’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 22, § 407:1, at 953 n.2 
(discussing that remedial measures taken by a “person not a party to the litigation are 
outside the scope of Rule 407” because this “will not expose that non-party to liability, 
and therefore will not discourage the non-party from taking the remedial measures in the 
first place”). 
 70 360 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 429. 
 73 See WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 407.05[2], at 407-26 n.10 
(citing several cases to support the proposition that even though the language of rule 407 
does not preclude the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures taken by a non-
party, such evidence must still be relevant under Rule 401 and more probative than 
prejudicial under Rule 403 before it is admitted). 
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ii. Governmental Mandate 
Rule 407 does not exclude evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures “taken by a party . . . in response to government regulations.”74 
This exception to the exclusionary force of the rule is a recognition that 
the social policy behind the rule of encouraging corrective measures to 
reduce future harm does not apply when corrective action is “mandated 
by a superior governmental authority,”75 because such mandate would 
not, in other circumstances, dissuade the defendant from taking remedial 
actions.76 
Several circuits have discussed the issue extensively. For instance, 
the Fifth Circuit in Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc.,77 opined that evidence of 
remedial measures “made solely in response to new federal 
environmental requirements,” and not in response to the accident that 
gave rise to the suit, was not a remedial measure contemplated by Rule 
407 and was admissible.78 In In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia,79 the 
Ninth Circuit held that when remedial measures were not taken 
voluntarily by the defendant, “the admission of [such] measure[s] into 
evidence does not ‘punish’ the defendant for his efforts to remedy his 
safety problems.”80 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit in O’Dell v. 
Hercules, Inc.,81 explained that evidence of remedial measures compelled 
by superior governmental authority is circumstantially admissible against 
a defendant “because the policy goal of encouraging remediation would 
not necessarily be furthered by exclusion of such evidence.”82 
IV. THE 1997 AMENDMENT DOES NOT FULLY IMPLEMENT THE PUBLIC 
POLICY OF THE RULE 
Legal scholars have argued that the 1997 amendment to Rule 407, 
that expressly limits exclusion of remedial measures to those taken after 
an event causing injury or harm, does not properly implement the public 
                                                                                                             
 74 See GRAHAM TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 54, at 450 
(explaining that such evidence will not adversely affect the policy of the Rule and that 
such evidence may be received only if it is relevant under Rule 401 and not subject to 
Rule 403 exclusion as overly prejudicial). 
 75 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 407.05[3]. 
 76 See generally id. 
 77 623 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 78 Id. at 928. The court, however, affirmed the district court’s exclusion of the 
evidence on relevancy and undue prejudice grounds under Rule 401 and Rule 403. 
 79 871 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. 
v. Causey, 493 U.S. 917 (1989). 
 80 Id. at 817. 
 81 904 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 82 Id. at 1204. 
448 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:435 
policy that underlies the rule.83 Professor Rice reasons that if potential 
defendants may be held to have implied their negligence, culpability, or 
strict product liability by taking remedial measures, there would be no 
incentive to take precautions at the time they become apparent.84 In 
effect, would-be defendants would purposefully hold off on taking 
remedial measures in order to take advantage of the “one bite for free” 
concept.85 
The limiting language of the rule fails to recognize the nature of the 
critical event that is central in both negligence and strict liability cases.86 
Professor Rice reasons that since the purpose of the subsequent remedial 
measures rule is to encourage safety measures, “it should be of no 
consequence that the safety measure (including a design change) was 
taken before the accident that gave rise to the action.”87 Specifically, in 
negligence cases, a defendant cannot be held liable for an injury that 
follows remedial measures because the defendant would “not have 
breached [its] duty of care at the time of the injury, regardless of its 
earlier negligence.”88 In strict product liability cases, the requirement of 
injury as a prerequisite for exclusion of remedial measures does nothing 
to encourage would-be defendants to “come forward with voluntary 
recalls or repairs to their products” before injury occurs.89 It also fails to 
recognize that evidence of remedial measures is not required to find a 
defendant strictly liable.90 Evidence that the product was defective at the 
                                                                                                             
 83 See NEW WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2.6.4, at 2:66 (opining that “the recent 
amendment to Rule 407, which categorically provides that the exclusionary provision is 
inapplicable to pre-accident remedial measures, is ill-advised.”). The author argues that 
the limitation “fails to do justice to the policy goals supporting the application of the 
exclusionary rule.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 84 See RICE EVIDENCE, supra note 27, at 248 (explaining that the purpose of taking 
any remedial measures in the first place is to “prevent future injury to others”). 
 85 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 86 RICE EVIDENCE, supra note 27, at 248; see also NEW WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 
2.6.4, at 2:60-61 (discussing that the “policy of the rule appears to apply even if the event 
that gave rise to the subsequent remedial measure was not the accident at issue in the 
litigation”). 
 87 NEW WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2.6.4, at 2.61 (emphasis in original). 
 88 Id., at § 2.6.4, at 2:66 (expounding that when an entity takes affirmative measures 
to remedy a known issue, it cannot be held to have violated its duty of care, regardless of 
when the remedial measure was taken). 
 89 RICE EVIDENCE, supra note 27, at 248. 
 90 See Email from Anthony T. Pierce, Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, 
L.L.P., to Eugene Goryunov, JD Candidate, The John Marshall Law School (Sep. 25, 
2006, 8:58 AM CST) (on file with authors) (opining that corporations should be 
encouraged to take remedial measures, both pre- and post-event). Mr. Pierce explains that 
such encouragement “should come in part, by giving a company the benefit of not having 
the fact that it saw and tried to fix a problem come back to haunt them if the fix doesn’t 
work.”  Id. 
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time that it was released into the stream of commerce will be sufficient to 
establish a prima facia case.91 
Prior to the 1997 amendment, a number of federal circuits excluded 
evidence of post-manufacture pre-accident remedial measures under the 
authority of Rule 407, not per Rule 403, holding that the policy of the 
rule required that such modifications be excluded when offered to show 
negligence, culpability, or strict product liability. While these cases 
constitute a minority position, they correctly reflect the underlying public 
policy. Some courts have defined the “event” language in the rule as the 
date of sale. For example, in Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc.,92 the 
plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly refused to admit evidence 
that the defendant manufacturer began to affix warning labels on a 
hydraulic press prior to the accident.93 The court reasoned that exclusion 
under Rule 407 was based on sound public policy intended to encourage 
manufacturers to take remedial measures in order to prevent potential or 
future harm.94 The Third Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it excluded evidence of post-sale pre-accident warning 
modifications under this rule because the underlying policy was “equally 
as supportive of exclusion of evidence of safety measures taken before 
someone is injured by a newly manufactured product” as after the 
injury.95 Later, in the same circuit, in Kelly v. Crown Equipment Co.,96 
the court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of post-manufacture, pre-
accident modifications to a forklift under Rule 407.97 The Third Circuit 
relied on Petree and recognized that since “people are loath to take 
actions which increase the risk of losing a lawsuit,” the rule can properly 
be applied to exclude pre-accident conduct as a matter of social policy.98 
The court ultimately held that while the express language of Rule 407 did 
not require the exclusion of pre-accident remedial measures, the policy 
considerations that form the basis of the rule justify such exclusion.99 
Some other courts have treated the “event” language in the rule as 
being the date of manufacture. On point, in Mills v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp.,100 the plaintiff, the decedent’s survivor, brought suit against the 
defendant aircraft manufacturer alleging that the defective design of the 
                                                                                                             
 91 NEW WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2.6.4, at 2:66. 
 92 831 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 93 Id. at 1197. 
 94 Id. at 1198. 
 95 Id. 
 96 970 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 97 Id. at 1276. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 1278. 
 100 886 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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airplane’s control assembly caused the aircraft to crash.101 The plaintiff 
tried to introduce a revised shop manual, published shortly before the 
accident, explaining how to install the control assembly such as to avoid 
locking-up the ailerons.102 The court noted that the exclusion of post-
manufacture pre-accident remedial measures under Rule 407 “would 
conform to the policy expressed in Rule 403” of excluding evidence that 
may confuse the jury.103 The court reasoned that evidence of “subsequent 
changes in the product or its design threatens to confuse the jury by 
diverting its attention from whether the product was defective at the 
relevant time to what was done later.”104 The jury’s attention should be 
“directed to whether the product was reasonably safe at the time it was 
manufactured” and not at the remedial measures taken after the fact.105 
As such, the Fifth Circuit held that the modified manual was properly 
excluded under Rule 407 because it could have been viewed by the jury 
as an admission of a defect in product design.106 
Similarly, in Wusinich v. Aeroquip Corp.,107 the plaintiff was 
injured while operating the defendant’s hose assembly machine when his 
pant leg was caught in the revolving hose.108 He alleged that as he pulled 
his leg away from the machine in an effort to reach the shut-off switch, 
the machine toppled over him, causing the protective guard to open and 
to expose the plaintiff to the rotating machinery.109 Prior to trial, the 
defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures, such as additional stabilization control to prevent 
tipping and other safety features, taken by the company after the 1968 
manufacture of the machine, but prior to the 1991 injury.110 The district 
court held that evidence of pre-accident, post-manufacture remedial 
measures should be excluded because the “policy concerns behind Rule 
407, such as promoting the improvement of product safety, significantly 
outweigh Plaintiffs’ request for admission of subsequent remedial 
measures.”111 
Other federal courts, prior to the 1997 amendment, have held that 
the language of Rule 407 did not require exclusion of post-manufacture 
                                                                                                             
 101 Id. at 760. 
 102 Id. at 762. 
 103 Id. at 763 (citing Grenada Steel Indus. v. Al. Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th 
Cir. 1983)). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 762. 
 107 843 F. Supp. 959 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 108 Id. at 960. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 960-61. 
 111 Id. at 962. 
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pre-accident remedial measures. However, these courts still concluded 
that such evidence was properly excluded under Rule 403 so as to further 
the policy basis for Rule 407. For example, in Raymond v. Raymond 
Corp.,112 the decedent was operating a 1981 Model 75 sideloader in the 
course of his employment at Edgcomb Metals in 1987.113 He was fatally 
injured when his sideloader collided with a steak beam.114 On appeal 
from a verdict in the defendant’s favor on the question of defective 
product design,115 the plaintiff alleged that the district court had 
improperly excluded evidence of pre-accident remedial measures and 
moved in limine to introduce evidence regarding the “addition of a back-
plate to [the defendant’s] Model 76 sideloader, which was first 
manufactured in 1983,” two years after the manufacture of the Model 75 
sideloader at issue and also four years before the accident.116 After 
finding that Rule 407 applies to strict liability cases,117 the court held that 
only measures which take place after the “event” causing injury or harm 
are excluded under the express language of the rule.118 Since the design 
modifications took place prior to the accident, the court noted that Rule 
407 does not preclude the admissibility of such evidence.119 However, 
the court excluded the evidence in question under Rule 403 as being 
more prejudicial than probative, relying on the relevancy basis 
underlying Rule 407 as a reason.120 Such evidence could reasonably 
confuse the jury and divert its attention from the condition of the product 
at the time that it entered the stream of commerce to other matters 
outside of the scope of the jury’s review. 
Further on point, in Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North 
America,121 the plaintiff was seriously injured in 1992 when her 
daughter’s 1986 Mercedes Benz 560 SEL rolled from its parking spot 
and struck her down and ran over her ankle.122 In a suit for strict liability, 
the plaintiff alleged that a park ignition interlock, which would have 
prevented her from removing her key if the car was in any other gear 
than “park,” would have prevented her injury.123 The plaintiff wanted to 
introduce evidence showing that Mercedes Benz began to install a park 
                                                                                                             
 112 938 F.2d 1518 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 113 Id. at 1520. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 1522. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 1523. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 1524. 
 121 104 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 122 Id. at 475. 
 123 Id. 
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ignition interlock system in all 1990 models.124 Citing Raymond, the 
court stated that the exclusion of evidence under the express language of 
Rule 407 “does not apply where, as here, the modification took place 
before the accident that precipitated the suit.”125 Ultimately, the First 
Circuit held that evidence of pre-injury modifications, while not 
expressly excluded by Rule 407, must nonetheless be excluded under 
Rule 403 as it “may reasonably be found unfairly prejudicial to the 
defendant and misleading to the jury” for resolving the strict liability 
claim.126 The court reasoned that the policy behind Rule 407, of not 
discouraging preventive acts that would reduce the chance of future 
injury or harm, would be furthered if such evidence were excluded.127 
The Fifth Circuit, in Foster v. Ford Motor Co.,128 was faced with 
similar facts. There, the decedent was killed when his 1975 Ford truck 
swerved and collided into a second truck that was heading in the opposite 
direction.129 The decedent’s widow and two minor children brought a 
wrongful death suit against the manufacturer of the truck, Ford Motor 
Co., alleging that the truck’s suspension system was defective.130 On 
appeal, the plaintiffs complained that the district court had improperly 
excluded evidence that some time after the manufacture and sale of the 
Ford truck in question, but before the accident itself, “Ford changed the 
spacer block assembly for 1976 and 1977 model trucks, casting it as one 
unit.”131 The plaintiffs intended to show that had the decedent’s truck 
incorporated the alternative design, the accident would not have 
occurred.132 However, the court noted that Ford had already conceded 
that the alternative design was feasible.133 As such, the policy and 
relevancy considerations supporting exclusion under Rule 407 allowed 
the court to properly exclude evidence of pre-injury remedial measures 
by applying Rule 403 in order to protect defendants who take the 
initiative to make preventive corrections from implying any wrongful 
conduct as “cumulative, [and] at worst, unfair, misleading or 
confusing.”134 
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 128 621 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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As a result of differing judicial interpretation and application of 
Rule 407, the need for clarification was necessary. During the April 22, 
1996 meeting of the Judiciary Advisory Committee in Washington D.C., 
two unnamed commentators proposed to extend the rule to products 
liability actions in order to “bar evidence of remedial measures taken 
after the sale of the product even if the changes occurred before the event 
causing injury or harm.”135 This proposal was rejected as being 
unnecessary without the benefit of a discussion or reasons.136 Even 
though the Advisory Committee failed to undertake a revision of the rule, 
some independent organizations and courts had recognized the need to 
expand exclusion under Rule 407 and to include pre-event remedial 
measures regardless of the underlying cause of action – negligence or 
strict products liability.137 
A. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) 
One of the most influential proponents of a revision to the language 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a whole, including Rule 407, is the 
NCCUSL, a non-profit unincorporated association comprised of 
approximately three hundred commissioners – law practitioners and legal 
academicians.138 The organization is endorsed by the ABA to promote 
uniformity among state rules and procedures.139 The NCCUSL has been 
working toward uniformity in state laws since 1892,140 and began its 
partnership with the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1940 to produce 
the UCC.141 
                                                                                                             
 135 Minutes of Meeting of Apr. 22, 1996, ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ev4-2296.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 
2007). 
 136 Id. 
 137 See Part IV [A]–[B] for a discussion of the NCCUSL and Evidence Project 
treatment of Rule 407, proposing revisions to the rule to exclude all remedial measures 
regardless of when they were taken. 
 138 Unif. Law Comm’rs, Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=11 (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2006). 
 139 See id. (explaining that before an act can be officially adopted as a Uniform or 
Model Act, a majority of no less than 20 states must approve that act). Once this happens, 
the Uniform or Model Act is “officially promulgated” for consideration by state 
legislators for adoption exactly as written to “promote uniformity in the law among the 
states.”  Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and its 
Lessons for Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 393, 
394 n.3 (2003). 
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Unlike the language of the current Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the proposed Rule 407 within the Uniform Rules of Evidence 
would preclude the admissibility of evidence of post-manufacture, pre-
injury remedial measures.142 This expansion of the scope of exclusion 
under the rule is achieved by defining the term “event” to include the 
“sale of a product to a user or consumer” in the last sentence of the 
rule.143 Defining the scope of the critical “event” was intended to reflect 
the judgment of the commissioners that the social policy of the rule 
would be better served if all would-be defendants were given “an 
incentive to take remedial measures before the injury, or harm, giving 
rise to the cause of action.”144 
B. The Evidence Project 
Professor Paul Rice is another influential legal authority and reform 
proponent. He has been a constant critic of the Advisory Committee on 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as the current state of the Federal 
Rules.145 In order to further his reform initiative, Professor Rice has 
established the Evidence Project,146 an extensive agenda of proposed 
changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence created through a seminar 
course in evidence taught at the Washington College of Law of the 
American University.147 Professor Rice explains that the proposed 
revisions to the Federal Rules are intended to create “consistency within 
the rule and between the rules, consistency with the theory of our 
adjudicatory process, [and] consistency with the Constitution.”148 
                                                                                                             
 142 UNIF. RULES OF EVID., Rule 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures: 
If, after an event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have 
made injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent 
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect 
in a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or 
instruction. Evidence of subsequent measures may be admissible if offered 
for another purpose, such as impeachment or, if controverted, proof of 
ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures. An event 
includes the sale of a product to a user or consumer. 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. RULES OF EVIDENCE ACT 
(Jul. 23-30, 1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ure/evid1200.htm 
(amended Mar. 8, 2005) (last visited Apr. 22, 2007). 
 143 Id. at Rule 407 Comment. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Symposium: Association of American Law Schools, Annual Meeting, Evidence 
Section Program: The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 734 
(2002). 
 146 See id. (stating that Professor Rice is the acting Director for the Evidence Project). 
 147 See id. at 766 (explaining that the purpose of the Evidence Project is to approach 
the rules of evidence from a position of simple consistency). 
 148 Id. 
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The proposed Rule 407, as presented by the Evidence Project, 
would result in the total exclusion of all evidence of remedial measures, 
regardless of when they were taken.149 This result is accomplished by 
removing any reference to the critical “event” language that would 
otherwise trigger exclusion under the rule.150 Professor Rice notes that 
the limitation in the current Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
excluding evidence of remedial measures only if taken after an event that 
causes injury or harm, makes the rule difficult to apply especially in 
situations where the decision to repair was made before an accident, but 
the repair was not actually made until after the accident, or where studies 
about the need for repair were made before the accident, but the decision 
to make such repairs followed the accident. 151 He concludes that “if all 
remedial measure[s] were made privileged, the current difficulties and 
conflicts [in applying the rule] would be avoided.”152 
C. Illinois Exclusion of Remedial Measures 
Illinois evidentiary rulings, like Federal Rule 407,153 exclude 
evidence of remedial measures in negligence154 and strict liability 
actions.155 However, in a substantial departure from the Federal Rule, 
                                                                                                             
 149 See Paul R. Rice, The Evidence Project: Revised Rule 407. Remedial Measures 
Commentary, available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/journals/evidence/ 
commentary/a4r407c.html (last visited Sep. 17, 2006) (discussing the policy rationale 
behind the proposed revision to Rule 407). 
 150 Revised Rule 407. Remedial Measures: 
Remedial measures are not admissible to prove negligence, or culpable 
conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a 
warning or instruction. Evidence of remedial measures may be offered for 
another purpose, such as impeachment or, if controverted, proof of 
ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures. A party may 
not call or examine a witness on a matter primarily for the purpose of 
impeachment with evidence of remedial measures. 
Paul R. Rice, The Evidence Project: Revised Rule 407. Remedial Measures, available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/journals/evidence/a4r407.html (last visited Sep. 17, 
2006). 
 151 See E-mail from Professor Paul Rice, Director of The Evidence Project, 
Washington College of Law at American University, to Eugene Goryunov, JD Candidate, 
The John Marshall Law School (Oct. 18, 2006, 10:05 AM CST) (on file with authors) 
(explaining that the exclusion under the rule is intended to prevent remedial measures 
from constituting an implied admission and that the limitation of excluding only post-
event remedial measures “makes little sense, is inconsistent with the logic of the rule and 
makes the rule difficult to apply”). 
 152 Id. 
 153 See JOHN E. CORKERY, ILLINOIS CIVIL & CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 133 (Law Bulletin 
Publ’g Co., 2000) (stating that “Illinois case law on subsequent remedial measures has 
been found comparable to the Federal Rule of Evidence 407”). 
 154 See, e.g., Schaffner v. Chi. & N. W. Transp. Co., 541 N.E.2d 643, 647 (Ill. 1989). 
 155 See, e.g., Davis v. Int’l Harvester Co., 521 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
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Illinois courts do not admit evidence of remedial measures taken prior to 
the event that gave rise to the cause of action.156 Illinois courts have 
reasoned that to allow the admissibility of evidence of post-manufacture 
preventive changes would have an adverse effect on future safety 
advancements.157 For this reason, Illinois courts exclude evidence of 
improvements made before or after an event causing an injury in both 
strict liability and negligence cases.158 This is also the position of several 
other state courts.159 
In a strict liability case, Smith v. Black & Decker,160 the plaintiff 
brought suit against the manufacturer of a power miter saw after he 
accidentally amputated his left hand.161 He alleged that the design of the 
saw was defective because it was not equipped with a right lower blade 
guard.162 On appeal, the Illinois appellate court held that the trial court 
had properly granted the defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of post-
                                                                                                             
 156 See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, CLEARY & GRAHAM’S HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS 
EVIDENCE, § 407.1, 234 (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter GRAHAM ILLINOIS EVIDENCE]; see 
also Worsley v. Farmington Pizza Co., 750 N.E.2d 1242, 1244 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (citing 
Carrizales v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 589 N.E.2d 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Smith v. Black & 
Decker, Inc., 650 N.E.2d 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) to show that evidence of post-
manufacture but pre-injury remedial measures are excluded in product liability cases). 
 157 GRAHAM ILLINOIS EVIDENCE, supra note 156. 
 158 Id.; The Illinois 89th General Assembly attempted to codify an exclusionary rule 
for remedial measures in the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995. However, the 
entire reform was held unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court for reasons 
unrelated to subsequent remedial measures. The legislation had the following language: 
When measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made an 
event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not 
admissible to prove a defect in a product, negligence, or culpable conduct in 
connection with the event. In a product liability action brought under any 
theory or doctrine, if the feasibility of a design change or change in 
warnings is not controverted, then a subsequent design change or change in 
warnings shall not be admissible into evidence. This rule does not require 
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another 
purpose such as proving ownership, control, or impeachment. 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-2105 (2007), amended by P.A. 89-7 § 15, invalidated by 
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1995). 
 159 The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 
P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1993), held that the language of the Kansas strict product liability statute 
prohibits the introduction of post-manufacture remedial measures. This exclusion is 
justified on the reasoning that a product’s defects should be judged as of the time when 
the product in question leaves the control of the manufacturer. Id. at 1308. Similarly, the 
Supreme Court of Montana, in Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195 (Mont. 1986), 
held that Mont. R. Evid. 407 precluded the admissibility of remedial measures taken after 
the date of manufacture because such evidence is “not probative of whether a product 
was defectively designed at the time of manufacture.”  Id. at 202. 
 160 650 N.E.2d 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 1111. 
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manufacture, pre-injury modifications to the miter saw.163 The court 
reasoned that “the same policy consideration, i.e., the potential chilling 
effect on safety improvements is present in product liability actions as in 
negligence actions regardless of whether the modifications were pre-
injury or post injury.”164 
Several years later in Brown v. Ford Motor Co.,165 the plaintiff, a 
survivor of a van explosion, brought a product liability action against the 
defendant manufacturer alleging that faulty nylon fuel lines in the van 
melted and leaked gasoline, and that this was the direct cause of the 
explosion.166 The Illinois appellate court found that the trial court 
properly excluded evidence that after the sale of the van in question, but 
before the accident, the defendant had changed the fuel lines from plastic 
to metal.167 Citing Smith v. Black & Decker, the court held that the public 
policy underlying the exclusion of remedial measures applies to bar the 
admissibility of such evidence, regardless of whether it was taken before 
or after the accident.168 
In Carrizales v. Rheem Mfg. Co.,169 a case based on a negligence 
cause of action, the plaintiff sued the defendant manufacturer to recover 
damages for personal injuries sustained when flammable vapors from his 
clothing were ignited by the flame of a gas-fired hot water heater.170 
Noting that the relevant time period in a negligent manufacture cause of 
action is the “time of sale or manufacture,”171 the court reasoned that to 
allow the admissibility of pre-injury remedial measures to show 
negligence would “have a chilling effect on the incentive to improve 
safety” in mass-produced and widely-used products.172 The Illinois 
appellate court held that the exclusion of evidence that the manufacturer 
of a water heater had placed warning labels on its heaters after the date of 
manufacture, but before the date of injury, was proper.173 
V. PROPOSAL TO AMEND RULE 407 
Though we reach the same conclusion as Professor Rice, our 
proposal relies more on the evidentiary relevancy rationale for amending 
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the rule than the social policy rationale that Professor Rice and his 
project have advanced. Nonetheless, we endorse the language that he has 
proposed for amending Rule 407. The amended rule should read as 
follows: 
Remedial measures are not admissible to prove negligence, 
culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product’s 
design, or a need for a warning or instruction. Evidence of 
remedial measures may be admitted if offered for impeachment 
or another purpose, if controverted, such as proving ownership, 
control, or feasibility of precautionary measure. 
Removing the “after an injury or harm” language from the text of 
the current rule is intended to explicitly state that exclusion under the 
rule is not restricted to remedial measures taken after an event.174 The 
removal of any language referring to an “event” is aimed at reducing 
confusion as to the meaning or scope of the rule. Although terms can be 
qualified or defined within the text of a rule, removing the phrase 
completely would foster uniform decisions and encourage consistency, 
both textual and logical, within the rule in question and between all of 
the rules together.175 This proposed rule would clearly bring Rule 407 
into conformity with the public policy that underlies the exclusion of 
remedial measures as an admission of negligence, culpability, product 
defect, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or 
instruction. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The proposed amendment to the current Rule 407 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence will encourage, without limitation, individuals, 
corporations, and municipalities to make remedial measures that would 
prevent future injury or harm. Such remedial measures, whether taken 
before or after an injury, must not be deemed to be admissions of 
negligence, culpability, a product defect, a defect in a product’s design, 
or a need for a warning or instruction. When courts admit evidence of 
pre-injury remedial actions they act contrary to the public policy of the 
rule and create a danger of jury confusion by providing them evidence 
that is more prejudicial than probative on the material issues in the case. 
                                                                                                             
 174 This modification is aimed to do away with the limitation in the rule created by the 
Advisory Committee that exclusion under the rule applies only to remedial measures 
taken after an event. See supra Part II .B for further discussion. 
 175 Even though the NCCUSL version of the proposed language of Rule 407 defines 
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To counter this problem, some federal courts have excluded pre-
injury remedial measures under a Rule 403 balancing process. In their 
view, Rule 403 operates to further the policy that underlies Rule 407. In 
our view, Rule 403 is not the answer. In order to promote logical 
consistency within Rule 407 and among the other Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the rule itself, and not Rule 403, should control the exclusion 
of evidence of remedial measures. 
